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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
A. C. KARTCHNER and 
IRENE B. KARTCHNER, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
LYMAN MERRILL HORNE, FRED-
ERICK C. SORENSEN, and CLIC-
QUOT CLUB BOTTLING COM-
PANY OF SALT LAKE CITY, 
UTAH, a corporation, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
7911 
The Clicquot Club Bottling Company of Salt Lake 
City is a corporation incorporated in the State of Utah 
February 3, 1947, with an authorized capital stock of 
200,000 shares of common stock and 100,000 shares 
of preferred stock, all of no par value ( 80) . * No 
*The figures enclosed in parentheses like this one refer to the page 
in the Record on Appeal supporting the statement. 
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2 
change has ever been made in the authorized capi-
tal. At the time of its organization, the capital stock 
both common and preferred, was fully subscribed 
and all of the shares subscribed were thereafter issued 
on March 1, 1947, to the subscribers (Exhibit "M"). 
During the course of this suit the stock issued was 
generally referred to as the Stanis stock, the Winder 
stock, the Horne stock, and the Sorensen stock. The 
stock with which we are concerned is the common 
stock only, and all references hereafter are to com-
mon stock. 
Prior to November 1, 1949, Mrs. Stanis owned 
10,000 shares, the Winders owned 48,000 shares, the 
Homes owned 41,000 shares, and Sorensen owned 
101,000 shares. On November 1, 1949, the defendants 
Lyman Merril Horne and Frederick C. Sorensen 
signed, sealed with the corporate seal and issued to 
Alton B. Kartchner and Irene B. Kartchner, the plain-
tiffs, as joint tenants, a certificate for 100,000 shares 
of said common stock. 
Upon the incorporation of the defendant corpor-
ation, the defendant Horne was elected President and 
Director and the defendant Sorensen was elected a 
Director and was employed as the Manager. Sorensen 
continued to be the Manager and a Director up to 
and including the time of the issuing of the certifi-
cate for 100,000 shares on November 1, 1949, which 
certificate shall hereinafter be called the Kartchner 
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certificate. The defendant Horne continued to be 
President and a Director until either October 31, 
1949, or November 1, 1949, depending upon the legal 
effect of his conduct. 
On October 31, 1949, Horne wrote, signed and 
mailed the following letters, and enclosed with them 
all of the stock certificate belonging to him and to 
Mrs. Horne, covering a total of 41,000 .shares ( 108, 
189), which certificates had been endorsed in blank 
because Horne did not then know the names of the 
persons to whom the stock was to be transferred 
( 189): 
LYMAN MERRILL HORNE, M. D. 
Physician and Surgeon 
220 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
October 31, 1949 
Clicquot Club Bottling Company of 
Salt Lake City 




Please find enclosed with this letter all the 
stock certificates in my name, Lyman M. 
Horne, M.D., and those in the name of Myrtle 
S. Horne. I am returning them to you as of 
the above date. I do hereby, relinquish my 
interest in the Clicquot Club Bottling Company 
of Salt Lake City. 
Very sincerely, 
(sgd) Lyman M. Horne, M.D. 
Lyman M. Horne, M.D. 
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LYMAN MERRILL HORNE, M. D. 
Physician and Surgeon 
220 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
October 31, 1949 
Clicquot Club Bottling Company of 
Salt Lake City 
15 South 2nd E. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Dear Sirs: 
Exhibit "0" 
I, hereby, resign as president of the company 
and director of the company ( Clicquot Club 
Bottling Company of Salt Lake City). 
This is because I cannot further support the 
company financially and because my health 
will not permit me to carry this responsibility. 
Sincerely, 
(sgd) Lyman M. Horne, M.D. 
Lyman M. Horne, M.D. 
Neither the letters nor the enclosed certificates 
had been received at the corporation offices at the 
time the Kartchner certificate was signed on Novem-
ber 1, 1949 ( 196). 
On November 1, 1949, at the time the Kartchner 
certificate was issued, the Stanis stock, 10,000 shares, 
was outstanding ( 115, 198, 216, and Finding No. 16), 
the Winder stock, 48,000 shares, was outstanding 
( 115, 116, 196 and Finding No. 16), the Horne stock, 
41,000 shares, was in the mail as stated above and 
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the Sorensen stock, 101,000 shares, was or was not 
outstanding, depending upon the effect of the follow-
ing facts: 
On March 1 , 1947, when Certificate No. 8, for 
101,000 shares was issued to Sorensen, that certificate 
was placed with the Horne certificate and was kept 
by Dr. Horne. in his medical office ( 194, 195), which 
is in the same building as the office and plant of the 
defendant corporation. It was kept by him until 
October 31, 1949, when it was enclosed, unendorsed 
( 116, 17 7, 180, 202-204), in the envelope with the 
letters of resignation and Horne stock and mailed to 
Sorensen at the corporation office. It had not been 
received by Sorensen or the corporation at the time 
the Kartchner certificate was issued ( 196). 
Prior to the time of the issuing of the Kartchner 
certificate Sorensen had intended to obtain the sur-
render of the Stanis, Horne and Winder stock, to com-
bine this with 1,000 shares of his own stock and sell 
it to the Kartchners, thus achieving a situation where 
he owned one-half the corporation and the Kartch-
ners owned one-half of the corporation. However, he 
had not actually done this prior to the issuance of the 
Kartchner certificate on November 1, 1949. Sorensen 
knew that the Winders had not surrendered their 
stock by November 1, 1949, and first discovered that 
they would not surrender their stock when he met 
with Homer Winder some time after November 17, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
1949 ( 232). He knew that the Stanis stock had not 
been surrended on November 1, 1949 (198, 207, 220), 
and he contemplated making a trip to California 
thereafter to obtain the transfer of the Stanis stock 
( 216) . He had made no transfer of his own stock but 
contemplated doing so in the future ( 197). Up until 
the meeting was held with Horner vVinder on or after 
November 17, 1949, Sorensen didn't know how much 
of his stock he might be required to surrender to 
effectuate his plans (208, 209, 220). 
In the summer of 1949, the plaintiffs had pur-
chased a distributorship in Provo for Clicquot Club 
products and the plaintiff A. C. Kartchner was oper-
ating that distributorship ( 118). In August, 1949, the 
defendant Sorensen commenced to negotiate with 
the plaintiff A. C. Kartchner relative to the sale of 
an interest in the defendant corporation ( 121). The 
defendant Horne knew there were negotiations for 
this sale in progress, but did not know with whom 
the negotiations were being carried on,. He did not 
personally contact either of the plaintiffs prior to 
November 1, 1949, nor did he, prior to that time, 
make any representations to them. There is a direct 
conflict in the evidence as to whether the defendant 
Sorensen misrepresented the nt worth and arning 
ability of the corporation and the court below re-
solved that conflict in his favor. At any rate, it was 
agreed that a one-half interest in the corporation 
could be purchased for $12,000.00 and the Provo 
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distributorship, which was given an agreed value of 
$6,000.00 ( 109, 212). Payment was to be made to 
the corporation and the stock issued by the corpor-
ation. 
On September 23, 1949, A. C. Kartchner gave 
Sorensen a check payable to the defendant Clicquot 
Club Bottling Company drawn on the joint funds of 
him and plaintiff Irene B. Kartchner for $1,000,00 
as earnest money ( 135). Both of. the plaintiffs and 
the defendant Sorensen and his wife were present at 
that time ( 122). On October 11, 1949, the plaintiffs 
paid $250.00, on October 13, 1949, $500.00, and on 
November 1, 1949, an additional $500.00. There-
after, on November 1, 1949, the plaintiffs went again 
to the company's office in Salt Lake City were the 
certificate for 100,000 shares (Exhibit "B") was is-
sued and the distributorship transferred to the com-
pany. Thereafter the plaintiffs paid an additional 
$9,796.53, making a total payment of $18,046.53 in 
money and property ( 136 and Exhibit "L") . One-half 
the money and property paid for the said stock was 
the property of the plaintiff Irene B. Kartchner ( 185) 
and one-half was the property of the plaintiff A. C. 
Kartchner (134, 135, 136). 
The plaintiff, Irene B. Kartchner, was present at 
some of the conversations preliminary to the stock 
purchase, though there is no evidence as to which 
conversations, or what was said. She was at the 
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meeting where the down payment of $1,000.00 was 
made, and was present when the November 1, 1949, 
payment was made, the distributorship transferred 
and the Kartchner certificate issued to her and Mr. 
Kartchner by the defendants Horne and Sorensen 
acting as the President and a Director, respectively, 
of the defendant corporation ( 184, 185). She be-
lieved the certificate to be valid and to represent 
100,00 shares of the capital stock of the defendant 
corporation ( 185). Had she believed otherwise, she 
would not hav~ paid for it ( 185). Further, there was 
nothing in the circumstances surrounding the trans-
action that indicated to her that the certificate might 
not be valid ( 185). Some of the time she leaves busi-
ness matters to her husband, and she left most of 
this one to him ( 185), but participated personally in 
at least the instances hereinabove noted. There is 
no evidence of what she left to her husband and what 
she did not. 
The plaintiff Alton C. Kartchner discussed the 
stock purchase with the defendant Sorensen many 
times. He knew there was stock outstanding before 
November 1, 1949 ( 148), but was told by Sorensen 
that it would all be in and signed over by November 
1, 1949 ( 148). At the time of the issuance of the 
Kartchner certificates, he asked Sorensen if the stock 
was all good and Sorensen replied that it was ( 148). 
When he received the stock certificate for 100,000 
shares, he believed it represented half the business of 
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The follou•ing paragraph should be inserted be-
tzrecn the second and third paragraphs on page 9 of 
the brief: 
The plaintiffs contended ( 1) that the Kartchner 
certificate \Yas void as an over-issue, and was not 
genuine· for the reason that Dr. Horne had resigned 
as President of the corporation prior to the time he 
~igned the certificate as President, (2) that the defen-
dants Horne and Sorensen represented to the plain-
tiffs that the certificate was valid and genuine and 
passed them title to 100,000 shares of the stock of 
the defendant corporation, but that said representa-
tions were false, ( 3) that the defendants Horne and 
Sorensen are the persons who issued the certificate 
as valid, in violation of their fiduciary duty to the 
plaintiffs, and their doing so constituted fraud and 
deceit as a matter of law, (4) that the plaintiffs and 
each of them \Vere entitled to rely a:qd did rely on 
the representations of the defendants, and that the 
plaintiffs were damaged thereby in the amount of 
$18,046.53, one-half of which had been paid from 
the separate property of each plaintiff, and ( 5) that 
the defendants Horne and Sorensen, as well as the 
corporation, were liable to them for the full amount 
of their damages. 
The court found for the defendants, and made 
and entered its judgment of no cause of action. The 
plaintiffs appeal taking the position that the testi-
Inony of the defendants themselves, together with 
that portion of the evidence of the plaintiffs on which 
there is no conflict in the record, require findings 
of fact and conclusions of law supporting a judgment 
in favor of each of them and against all the defen-
dants and ask that the trial court be reversed and 
judgn1ent be entered accordingly. 
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the Clicquot Club Bottling Company, and would not 
have paid for the stock had he believed otherwise 
(134). -- .:;:Ats;;~tr' 
After the stock purchase, the company continued 
to operate under the direction of the plaintiff A. C. 
Kartchner and the defendant Sorensen until June 6, 
1950, \Yhen it went into receivership (81). No part 
of the $18,046.53 paid has ever been repaid to the 
plaintiffs ( 139). 
The court found for the defendants and made 
and entered its judgment of "no cause of action" as 
to all the defendants. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I 
There is insufficient evidence in the record to 
support certain of the Findings of Fact made by 
the trial court. 
II 
The trial court failed to make certain Findings 
of Facts which the uncontroverted evidence requires. 
III 
Officers and directors occupy a fiduciary rela-
tion to persons to whom they sell stock in the corpor-
ation of which they are officers. 
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IV 
It is the duty of officers and directors to know 
that material statements in stock certificates and the 
representations implicit in their signing and issuing 
those certificates are true. 
v 
Such officers and directors are personally liable 
to persons who relied upon the truth of those repre-
sentations which are proved to have been false when 
made. 
VI 
Scienter or knowledge on the part of one making 
a material representation which is in fact false is 
not necessary to liability for damages arising there-
from where there is a duty on the part of such person 
to know the facts and his lack of knowledge is due 
to a neglect of duty. 
VII 
One who represents a thing to be true without 
knowing it to be true is liable in deceit if it is in 
fact false. 
VIII 
Neither ratification nor estoppel can render the 
Kartchner certificate valid or give the plaintiffs any 
rights under it. 
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ARGUMENT 
Before we can usefully discuss the points of law 
involved in this case it is necessary to determine 
what facts are established by the record. The find-
ings of facts entered below do not give us this infor-
mation because much was found which was not 
supported by the evidence and much was not found 
which the record clearly established. Hence this 
argument will deal first with the facts, then with 
the law. 
In this regard it should be pointed out that no 
-r,) 
objection is made ai thosefindings which are material 
and are supported by the record and there is no 
discussion of those findings which are immaterial, 
whether supported by the record or not. 
Point I 
There is Insufficient Evidence in the Record to 
Support the Following Findings of Fact Made by the 
Trial Court: 
A. Finding No. 1.2 wherein it states: 
"That defendant Horne was not a party 
to, nor did he have anything whatsoever to 
do with, the negotiation or agreement finally 
reached between the Clicquot Club Bottling 
Company, defendant Sorensen and plaintiffs, 
nor were any representations made by defen-
dant Horne to plaintiffs directly or through 
any third party." 
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The evidence relative to this point is that the 
defendant Horne never talked with either of the 
plaintiffs prior to November 1, 1949. This fact is 
not in dispute. However, during all of the period 
of the negotiation for the sale of this stock the defen-
dant Horne was the President and a Director of the 
corporation whose stock was to be sold, and had 
made arrangements with Sorensen to find a buyer 
for the stock ( 187, 188). He says: 
"I made arrangement with Mr. Sorensen, 
if he found a buyer who was a business man 
and would come in and take hold of this com-
pany, come in and ··make· a success of it, I 
would give him all my stock, and Mrs. Horne 
would give him all her stock, and I would, in 
addition to that, cancel all the obligations of 
the company to me." 
This is verified by the defendant Sorensen who 
testified as follows ( 210) : 
"* * * The stockholders, Dr. Horne, Mrs. 
Horne, the Winders had told me they didn't 
want to support the company at all any more, 
and they would surrender their stock and for 
me to find a buyer that was competent to go 
into the business." 
In fact, Dr. Horne signed the certificate for 
100,000 shares of stock as President of the defendant 
corporation knowing it was to go to the Kartchners 
as purchasers and intending them to rely on its 
validity (112, 113, 114): 
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Q (by Mr. Tanner). "'I show you Dr. 
Horne, \Yhat is marked Exhibit "B," which 
purports to be 100,000 shares of capital stock 
of the Clicquot Club Bottling Company, and 
ask you to examine the signature in the space 
reserved for the signature of the president, 
and ask you if you will tell us if that is your 
signature? 
A. "Yes sir." 
* * * * * 
Q (by Mr. Tanner). "During the time 
you were-strike that. It was necessary for 
the issue of a valid stock certificate in this cor-
poration that it bear the signature of both the 
president and secretary-treasurer, was it not, 
Mr. Home? 
A. "I don't know, you tell me. 
Q. "Was that your understanding? 
A. "Yes sir. 
Q. "You believed that to be the case? 
A. "Well, those names are on certificates, 
and Frederick brought that to me and asked 
if I would sign it, Mr. Kartchner wanted that 
certificate right now before he went away, so 
I signed it. 
Q. "Answer 'yes' or 'no' then it will save 
the court's time. At the time you signed the 
certificate you know the certificate was for 
100,000 shares of stock? 
A. "Yes. 
Q. "You knew it was a certificate to be 
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purchased by Irene and A. C. Kartchner did 
you not? 
A. "Yes, that is correct. 
Q. "At that time -
A. "I don't know about Irene; let me look 
at that? 
Q. "By Mr. and Mrs. Kartchner, let's 
put it that way? 
A. "All right. 
Q. "Is that true? 
A. "Yes. 
Q. "At that time did you know that they 
were to pay for that certificate? 
A. "Well I had made no arrangements 
about payments, Mr. Sorensen was taking care 
of that. 
Q. "Well, at the time that that was 
signed by you, or prior to that time Mr. Sor-
ensen had told you he was selling 100,000 
shares to Mr. Kartchner, had he not?" 
* * * * * 
A. "He had not prior to that time. 
Q (by Mr. Tanner). "At the time he 
tendered it to you, did he tell you that? 
A. "At the time he tendered it to me, 
he said Mr. Kartchner was going to buy half 
of the company. 
Q. "Did he say how much he was going 
to pay for it? 
A. "No sir. 
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Q. ""You understood he "vas going to pay 
something for it, did you not? 
A. "Yes sir. 
Q. "'Vhen you signed that certificate you 
intended the Kartchners to rely on its validity 
and genuineness, did you not, Dr. Horne?" 
* * * * * 
A. "When I sign an instrume.nt, yes, it 
is supposed to be genuine and it was genuine." 
That certificate was thereupon affixed with the 
corporate seal and issued to the plaintiffs. 
It cannot be said that Dr. Horne made no rep-
resentations to the plaintiffs. By the act of signing 
this stock certificate as President for issue to the 
plaintiffs he at least represented to them that it was 
a valid certificate and that he was the President of 
the corporation. Plaintiffs claim he made other rep-
resentations by these acts which will be discussed 
later, but even the most narrow construction of his 
acts shows that he did make the above representations 
to the plaintiffs. 
It is not necessary to speak to a person to make 
representations to him. Representations often take 
the form of acts and sometimes of silence, and a rep-
resentation is no less a representation because it is 
made on a stock certificate which is then carried by 
another to the person or persons to whom the certifi-
cate is issued. 
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It cannot be said that the defendant Horne had 
nothing to do with the negotiation or agreement to 
purchase, for according to the defendant's own testi-
mony, he was the President of the company of which 
Sorensen was Manager, and had expressly author-
ized Sorensen to find a buyer. It cannot be said 
that he made no representations to the plaintiffs 
because by his own testimony he establishes that he 
signed a stock certificate for issue to them and for 
them to rely on. 
B. Finding No. 13 wherein it states: 
"The defendant Horne and defendant 
Sorensen transmitted their stock certificates 
to the office of the corporation endorsed in 
blank." 
This is true as to Horne, but not as to Sorensen. 
According to the testimony of the defendant 
Horne he put his and his wife's certificates in a letter 
on October 31, 1949, endorsed in blank, addressed to 
the corporation ( 189) : 
Q (by Mr. Mulliner). "Did you hold 
those shares in the spring and summer of 1949? 
A. (by Dr. Horne). "Yes sir. 
Q. What disposition did you make, if any, 
·of these shares at that time? 
A. "On October 31st, 1949, I mailed them 
to the Clicquot Club Bottling Company signed 
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-they were to go to Mr. Kartchner, but at 
that time I didn't know his name, it was just 
someone Mr. Sorensen was selling half of the 
company to, and I didn't know his name, so I 
just sent them blank, and sent them to the 
company~ and they could \\Tite his name in 
when they got there.'' 
Further, he enclosed Sorensen's certificate with 
them and sent it downstairs to the corporation office 
(116,117): 
Q (by Mr. Tanner). "Then, Frederick 
Sorensen hadn't turned back his 101,000 shares 
by November 1st, 1949, had he? 
A. (by Dr. Horne). You will have to ask 
Frederick. I can tell I held Frederick's stock 
in my drawer from the time the company 
started until I turned the stock back; when I 
turned my stock back I sent his stock down-
stairs-what he did after that-it went back 
in the company, sir. 
Q. Doctor, on Novembr 1st, 1949, Fred-
erick Sorensen had not signed his certificate, 
had he? Before you answer that you are per-
fectly free to read page 33 of your deposition. 
A. "I don't believe he had; there had 
been a lot of talk about it, actually I don't 
think I had the certificate. I don't know. 
Q. "In the deposition you said he had not 
signed it? 
A. "That is from hearsay, sir, there was 
a lot of talk about it. 
Q. "Did you believe it hadn't been 
signed? 
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A. "I believed it hadn't been signed, but 
the certificate was in the box of the Clicquot 
Club Bottling Company, so if he hadn't signed 
it, it was the company's own fault. 
Q. "At any rate it was not endorsed by 
Novernber 1st, 1949, is that not true 
A. "Well, if it wasn't it was their own 
fault." 
In view of the fact that Sorensen's endorsement 
of his certificate for 101,000 shares was witnessed by 
Dr. Horne (Exhibit 2), Dr. Horne's belief as stated 
above would be entitled to considerable weight. 
Sorensen's testimony also is to the effect that he 
had not endorsed his certificate by the time the 
Kartchner certificate was issued ( 180): 
Q. (by lVIr. Tanner) "And is that the stock 
ownership as you believed it to be November 
1st, 1949? 
A. (by Mr. Sorensen) "No, October 31st, 
Q. "On the evening of October 31st? 
A. "Yes, let's put it that way. 
Q. "Then subsequent to that time, and 
prior to the time that the certificate was 
handed to Mr. Kartchner, what, if any, of 
that stock was actually returned and released? 
A. "Dr. Horne's stock was returned to the 
corporation. 
Q. "As of what date? 
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A. ''As of that date, I believe. 
Q. "And that is the only stock that was 
turned in at any time, is that right? 
A. "11Jy stock was there, it was not en-
dorsed. 
Q. "In other words, it hadn't been turned 
back? 
A. "It hadn't been turned back. 
Q. "That is correct, isn't it? 
A. "That is correct." 
Horne again testifies that it was not endorsed 
(202): 
Q. (by Mr. Tanner). "Prior to that time 
had he given it to you? 
A. (by Dr. Horne). "It was with our 
certificates, as I recall, all together. 
Q. "Was it signed on the back, that is, 
was it endorsed or was that just where he kept 
it? 
A. "I don't know. 
Q. "You don't know? 
A. "I can't say for sure whether it was 
signed or not signed. 
Q. "Do you know whether that is where 
Fred customarily kept his certificate? 
A. "Yes, I believe I had seen it there 
before with our certificates. 
Q. "That is while he still owned them? 
A. "While he still owned it, and after we 
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had given ours to him, I think they were lying 
in the drawer together, but he hadn't signed 
his at that time because he didn't know who 
was going to get it." 
Dr. Horne's testimony shows that "we had given 
ours to him" by mailing the certificates to Sorensen. 
They were not received until after the Kartchner 
certificate was issued. Hence, the time referred to 
above must have been after November 1, 1949. 
The uncontradicted testimony of the defendants 
establishes that Sorensen's certificate was sent back 
to the office of the corporation in a letter mailed Oct-
ober 31, 1949, and that it was not endorsed. 
C. Finding No. 15, wherein it states, concern-
ing the period after November 1, 1949. 
"That plaintiff A. C. Kartchner kept the 
books and records of said company and had 
such records, including the stock book, under 
his care and custody." 
This is inaccurate only insofar as it fails to show 
that the books and records of the company, including 
the stockbook, were kept at the office of the corpora-
tion and equally accessible to the defendant Sorensen 
and the plaintiff A. C. Kartchner. 
D. Finding No. 16 wherein, referring to the 
period of time during the negotiations preceding the 
purchase of stock by the plaintiffs, it states: 
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"That plaintiff A. C. Kartchner \vas ad-
vised by defendant Sorensen that if such stock 
was not surrendered, Sorensen would be o b-
liged to take a reduction of his proposed inter-
est in said company, which was understood by 
said parties and agreed to," and 
"it \Yas considered by all concerned that 
Sorensen was entitled to 42,000 shares of said 
stock.'' 
There is evidence that Sorensen told the plaintiff 
A. C. Kartchner that he would take a lesser interest 
in the corporation if the Stanis. or Winder stock did 
not come in, but there is no evidence anywhere in 
the record that the plaintiff Irene B. Kartchner was 
so advised and there is no evidence that the plaintiff 
Iren B. Kartchner ever was told, believed, or knew 
that Sorensen was to have less than 100,000 shares of 
stock. The only way the suggestion that there is no 
evidence on a point can be verified is by reading the 
record and finding it to be true. Perhaps, however, 
the respondent will agree to the truth of the propo-
sition and save the court that onerous task. 
E. Finding No. 17 wherein it states: 
"That at the time of issuance to plaintiffs 
of their certificate for 100,000 shares, there 
was available for reissue in the treasury of said 
corporation 142,000 shares of said common 
stock, and that the said shares issued to plain-
tiffs did not constitute an overissue, but were 
within the authorized limits as provided by 
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the Articles of Incorporation of said corpora-
tion." 
This concerns one of the most vital points in the 
case. One of the prime problems is whether, as a 
matter of law, the Kartchner certificate represented 
an overissue. Except for the question of whether the 
Sorensen certificate was endorsed, there is no conflict 
relative to the facts on this point,lbut there is a conFlict 
on the interpretation of their effect. 
At the time of the issuance of the Kartchner 
certificate for 100,000 shares of this common stock 
of the defendant corporation to the plaintiffs, Novem-
ber 1, 1949, the Stanis stock, 10,000 shares, was not 
surrendered and the Winder stock, 48,000, was not. 
These two blocks of stock were never transferred to 
the corporation for re-issue. On this point all parties 
to this suit are in agreement. 
The Horne stock, 41,000 shares, had been en-
dorsed in blank and was, at the moment of issue 
of the Kartchner certificate, in the United States mail 
directed to the corporation, together with a letter 
stating: 
"Please find enclosed with this letter all 
the stock certificates in my name, Lyman M. 
Horne M.D., and those in the name of Myrtle 
S. Horne. I am returning them to you as of 
the above date. I do hereby, relinquish my 
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interest in the Clicquot Club Bottling Company 
of Salt Lake City. 
Very sincerely, 
(sgd) Lyman JVI. Horne, M.D. 
Lyman M. Horne, M.D." 
Whether this makes the Horne stock the prop-
erty of the corporation and thus available for re-
issue is discussed later under point II (C) at pages 
45 to 49 inclusive. 
The Sorensen certificate, 101,000 shares, was in 
the same envelope as the Horne certificates and Dr. 
Horne's resignation as President. This is undisputed. 
It was not endorsed (supra), and the envelope in 
which it had been transmitted had not been received 
at the corporation office at the time of the issuance 
to the plaintiffs of their certificate for 100,000 shares. 
The defendant Horne, whose testimony is the only 
evidence on the point, states as follows ( 196) : 
A. "(At the time I signed the Kartchner 
certificate for 100,000 shares) I asked Mr. Sor-
ensen, 'Should I sign the certificate; I sent you 
a resignation last night.' He said 'I haven't 
got it,' so officially the company hadn't re-
ceived my resignation, so I was officially still 
considered the company's president, so I signed 
it." (Parentheses ours) 
Since the Sorensen certificate was in the same 
envelope as Horne's resignation, it follows that the 
certificate had not been received at the corpo~ation 
office. 
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Relative to Sorensen's intention at this time con-
cerning his stock it is important to note the abundant 
testimony that Sorensen didn't know until some time 
after November 1, 1949, whether the Stanis or 
Winder stock would be surrendered and hence did 
not know how much stock he would have to transfer 
to the corporation in order to give the Kartchners 
100,000 shares ( 198, 20 7, 208, 209, 216, 220, 232). 
According to the defendant Horne, Sorensen 
stated at the time of the issue of the Kartchner certifi-
cate that he was going to turn back his 101,000 shares 
(197, 198): 
Q. "Did you think Sorensen had turned 
it back, his 101,000 at that time? 
A. "No, I presume it could be completed 
was for him to do that. 
Q. "Did you assume he had? 
A. "He said that is what he was going to 
do. Whether he had done it a few months ago, 
one way or the other, that is the arrangement." 
This would squarely negative any finding that 
Sorensen had previously or contemporaneously sur-
rendered his stock. 
The legal effect of these facts, like those con-
cerning the Horne stock, is discussed under point 
II (C) at pages 45 to 54 inclusive. There is is pro-
posed that the proper finding would be that there 
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'vas no stock available for issue at the time of the 
issue of the Kartchner certificate for 100,000 shares 
and, hence, that is constituted an overissue in its 
entirety. 
F. Finding No. 19 is as follows: 
"That plaintiff A. C. Kartchner acted for 
and in behalf of plaintiff Irene B. Kartchner, 
his ,vife, in the negotiations and formation of 
the contract aforesaid and handled her inter-
est in said corporation at all times, and that 
the said Irene B. Kartchner was bound by the 
action of her husband and acquiesced therein." 
The portion stating "that the said Irene B. 
Kartchner was bound by the action of her husband 
and acquiesced therein" is a conclusion of law, not 
a finding of fact. 
The evidence that is important relative to this 
finding is the evidence: 
(1) that the plaintiff Irene B. Kartchner per-
sonally participated in some of the meetings leading 
up to the stock purchase: 
See the following testimony of the defendant 
Sorensen ( 217) : 
A. "I can't tell; there were so many 
meetingts: - occasionally Mrs. Kartchner, 
when we were in their home, she was there, 
and I only remember on one other occasion 
when somebody else was present, that is when 
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Mr. Ralph Keddington was with us in Kartch-
ner's home, so as to persons with us, that is 
the only time I know." 
(2) That she personally participated in the 
meeting of September 20, 1949, when the price to 
be paid for the stock was agreed upon ( 122); 
(3) That she personally participated in the 
November 1, 1949, meeting where she received the 
stock certificate for which she paid ( 181, 182): 
Q. (by Mr. Tanner). "Will you state 
your name please? 
A. "Irene Bain Kartchner. 
Q. "Mrs. Kartchner, you are one of the 
plaintiffs in this action? 
A. "Yes. 
Q. "Were you present when the stock 
certificate, which is the plaintiff's Exhibit "B" 
was issued by the president and director of the 
Clicquot Club Bottling Company of Salt Lawe 
City, November 1st, 1949? 
A. "Yes, I was. 
Q. "At that time, Mrs. Kartchner, did 
you believe that to be a valid certificate? 
A. "Yes. 
Q. "Did you believe that is represented 
100,000 shares of Clicquot Club stock? 
A. "I thought so. 
Q. "If you had not believed it was a valid 
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stock certificate, reprsentiug 100,000 shares of 
stock, \Yould you have paid for it? 
A. "No. 
Q. '·\iV as it a fact that half of the money 
and property paid for this certificate \Vas prop-
erty of yours? 
A. "Yes. 
Q. "Now, was there anything in the cir-
cumstances surrounding this transaction that 
indicated to you, or made you feel that that 
certificate was not a valid certificate? 
A. "No." 
( 4) And that she handled some of her own 
business matters and some of this particular business 
matter, and talked it over with her husband. This 
appears through the limiting portions of her follow-· 
. ing testimony ( 182): 
Q. (by Mr. Mulliner). "Mrs. Kartchner, 
do you leave your business matters, especially 
this particular one in regard to the Clicquot 
Company, to your husband? 
A. "Well, yes, sometimes. 
Q. "Did you? 
A. "Yes, most of it. 
Q. "Did he act as your representative in 
negotiating this transaction? 
A. "Well, we talk it over together." 
The burden of proof is on the defertdants to 
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show that the plaintiff A. C. Kartchner vvas the agent 
of the plaintiff Irene B. Kartchner if they seek to 
bind her by any knowledge he may have had, or 
by his acts. As set forth above, the evidence shows 
a substantial personal participation by Mrs. Kartch-
ner in the negotiations and further shows: 
( 1) That ·she sometimes leaves her busi-
ness matters to her husband, but not always, 
(2) That she left most of the business 
matters in regard to the Clicquot Company to 
her husband, but not all of it, and 
(3) That they talked the matter over 
together. 
All of the above acts on Mrs. Kartchner's part 
are as equally consistent with the position of "busi- . 
ness adviser" and "one being advised" so far as this 
transaction is concerned as they are with agency. 
Further, they are as consistent vvith simple joint ten-
ancy as they are with agency. The evidence on the 
point of agency is clearly insufficient to sustain a 
finding that relation existed between the plaintiffs. 
If, however, the court did believe the testimony 
showed an agency relation, there is a complete lack 
of proof of when Mrs. Kartchner did and when she 
did not leave this particular business matter in Mr. 
Kartchner's hands, and the court, in the absence of 
proof cannot presume, and will not guess when the 
claimed agency was in force and was not. A finding 
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-~ that an agency relation existed at any stated time 
so as to bind Mrs. Kartchner for Mr. Kartchner's 
knowledge or acts at that time would have to be 
based on pure conjecture. 
For these reasons the plaintiffs believe there can 
be no finding of agency, and hence no binding of 
the plaintiff Irene B. Kartchner by the actions or 
knowledge of the plaintiff A. C. Kartchner. 
G. Finding No. 20 states: 
"That no false representations were made 
to Plaintiffs, or either of them by Defendants, 
or either of them, with regard to the amount 
of accounts payable owed by Clicquot Club 
Bottling Company or as to the condition of the 
stock holdings of said corporation. That said 
stock was issued to Plaintiffs in good faith, and 
full disclosure of all facts were made in the 
negotiations between them, and that the stock 
holding of Plaintiffs, in the amount of 100,000 
shares, has at all times been admitted and rec-
ognized by all Defendants." -
There is a conflict in the evidence relative to the 
representations concerning the amount of accounts 
payable owed by the defendant corporation. Hence, 
there is some evidence to sustain a finding that there 
were no false representations made in that regard. 
However, there is no conflict relative to the pro-
position that the defendants both in fact and in law 
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represented the Kartchner certificate to be valid and 
genuine, or, in the words of Sorensen, "good." There 
is no conflict in the evidence that the defendant 
Horne represented himself to be the President of 
the defendant corporation when he signed the 
Kartchner certificate as "President." The evidence 
is undisputed on which the proposition is based that 
the act of issuing the certificate constitutes certain 
representations as a matter of law. Hence, if, in 
fact, Horne was not President of the defendant cor-
poration, or the Kartchner certificate was not valid 
and genuine, and did not pass title to 100,000 shares 
of the common stock of the defendant corporation, 
those representations were false. The plaintiffs will 
show later in this brief that, as a matter of law, the 
certificate was not genuine or valid, but was and is 
void and passes no title for any stock, also that Horne 
terminated his tenure as President of the defendant 
corporation before he signed the certificate, and thus 
his representation that he was President was false. 
If the plaintiff;s propositions are upheld that the 
stock is void as an overissue, it is apparent that there 
cannot have been a full disclosure of all the facts. 
Particularly since there is an absolute and complete 
lack of evidence of any disclosure to Mrs. Kartchner 
concerning the future stock holdings of the other 
shareholders besides herself and Mr. Kartchner. 
That the stock holdings of the plaintiffs have 
been at all times admitted and recognized by all of 
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the defendants is immaterial since an issue of stock 
which is ultra vires for the reason that it is an over-
issue cannot be validated by any subsequent act of 
the corporation or its officers. There is no power in 
a corporation to issue more stock than is authorized 
by its charter. 
Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporations, vol. 12, Sec. 
5144: 
"·\Vhere there is an overissue, the increase 
and the certificates are void because of the 
· fact that it is beyond the powers of the corpor-
ation to create and issue the additional stock, 
and the holders of the certificates, therefore, 
whether they be the original holders or their 
bona fide transferees, do not become stock-
holders; and the holders of such illegal stock 
cannot be relieved by an issue of stock, or com-
pel the corporation to recognize them as stock-
holders. The rule that a corporation cannot 
issue shares beyond the amount authorized by 
the legislature prevents a court from compell-
ing the issuance of a certificate of stock to one 
claiming to be entitled thereto, where an over-
issue would result therefrom. An unauthorized 
increase of capital stock is none the less void 
because made by unanimous agreement 
among the stockholders, and under an honest 
misapprehension as to their powers." 
See also discussion and cases cited in the last 
portion of the Argument under point IIC at pages 
52 to 54 inclusive and point VIII at pages 67, 68 
and 69. 
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Point II 
The Trial Court Failed to Make Findings of Fact 
Which Uncontroverted Evidence Requires. 
For the convenience of the Court, we will not 
restate here all the facts as we believe they should be 
found. Most of the facts are set forth in the State-
ment of Facts at the beginning of this brief. It is 
the contention of the appellants that the trial court 
should have made findings in accordance with the 
facts in said Statement, together with those hereafter 
urged, and the propositions of law will be argued in 
the light of the facts as thus stated. 
Those findings which the Court did not make, 
but should have made, will be dealt with one at 
a time, but are summarized as follows: 
A. That Sorensen orally represented that the 
Kartchner stock was good at the time the Kartchner 
certificate was issued. 
B. That by the act of signing and issuing the 
certificate, both Horne and Sorensen made certain 
material representations concerning its genuineness 
and validity. 
C. That each of those representations was false 
when made. 
D. That the defendants and each of them knew 
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the facts that made their representations false, and 
made those representations either knowing them to 
be false, or without knowing them to be true. 
E. That the plaintiffs, and each of them, were 
entitled to rely and did rely upon the false represen-
tations of the defendants and each of them, to their 
damage in the amount of $18,046.53. 
A 
The Court should have found that the defendant 
Sorensen orally represented to the plaintiff A. C. 
Kartchner that the stock which was outstanding had 
been returned to the treasury of the corporation and 
that the Kartchner certificate was good. 
The only evidence relative to this proposition is 
the testimony of the plaintiffs A. C. Kartchner in 
answer to questions by Mr. Arnovitz as follows ( 172, 
173): 
Q. (by Mr. Arnovitz). "Mr. Kartchner, 
you asked to have the stock certificate deliv-
ered to you knowing that some of the other 
certificates had not yet been turned into the 
company, is that correct? 
A. (by Mr. Kartchner). "That is not 
correct. 
Q. "What is the fact? 
A. "In October, when we come to the 
agreement I would go in, I was to go up Nov-
ember 1st and go to work. At that time that 
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give Mr. Sorensen one months time, practi-
cally, to get the stock back in, have it all fixed 
up. I came up that day and I asked if the stock 
was all good, he said 'Yes it was good.' " 
The defendant Sorensen nowhere in his testi-
mony denied this proposition. Whether this repre-
sentation is important depends on whether the 
Kartchner stock was "good" when issued, i.e., on 
whether the representation is true or false. This is 
discussed later. 
B 
The trial court should have found that defendant 
Horne made the following material representations 
to each of the plaintiffs: 
1. That he was, at the time of the signing and 
issuing of the Kartchner certificate on November 1, 
1949, the duly authorized and acting President of 
the defendant corporation. 
2. That he knew of nothing which would or 
might make his acts as such President invalid. 
3. That the certificate for 100,000 shares of 
stock of said corporation was genuine and valid. 
4. That the certificate passed the title to 100,000 
shares of the capital stock of said corporation. 
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5. That there \Yere no facts vvhich were or 
should have been known to him which ·would render 
. 
said certificate, or any portion thereof, invalid. 
The trial court should have found that the defen-
dant Sorensen made the sarne Inaterial representa-
tions to each of the plaintiffs, except that he repre-
sented that he \vas a Director and that he knevv of 
nothing v:hich \Yould make his own acts as Director 
invalid or Horne's acts as President invalid. 
The scope of the representations that a corporate 
officer makes vvhen he signs and issues, or signs for 
issue, a corporate stock certificate or other security 
is a matter of construction in each case. When he 
signs in a space clearly labeled as being the space for 
the signature of an officer of the corporation, he neces-
sarily represents to anyone receiving the certificate 
that he is that officer. The defendant I-Iorne signed 
on the signature line of the Kartchner certificate 
above the word "President" and the defendant Sor-
ensen signed above the word "Director." (See Exhibit 
"B".) Ordinary common sense dictates the conclusion 
that they, by so signing, represent themselves to be 
those officers in that corporation. 
It seems implicit in the above conclusion that 
the defendant Horne also represented that he had not 
resigned his office as President. Further, since he 
is the one who would know if he had done anything 
vvhich would throw his status as President in ques-
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tion, he should be held to represent by his signing 
the certificate for issue to the Kartchners that he had 
done nothing which would, or might, destroy his 
authority to act as such President, and hence would, 
or might, render such acts invalid. Here, the defen-
dant Horne had signed and mailed to the corporation 
an explicit letter of resignation and all of his stock. 
He should be held liable for the consequence of those 
acts. 
Further, by signing the certificate, both Horne 
and Sorensen represented the certificate to be gen-
uine and valid, and that it was not invalid by reason 
of their own acts or omissions. This is established by 
the following cases: 
Windram vs. French, 151 Mass. 547,24 N.E. 914, 
8 L.R.A. 750: 
"There is no doubt that, by thus authenti-
cating and issuing the certificates, the defen-
dants made certain representations which ac-
companied them, and which, like the offer in 
a letter of credit, addressed themselves to who-
ever should purchase those certificates there-
after, whoever he might be. Bruff vs. Mali, 36 
N.Y. 200, 205. See Bartholomew vs. Bentley, 
15 Ohio 659; Clark vs. Edgar, 84 Mo. 106; First 
National Bank vs. Lanier, 11 Wall. 369, 378; 
Matthews vs. Bank, 1 Holmes 396; Lobdell vs. 
Baker, 3 Mete. 469, 471. 
"The scope of these representations is mat-
ter of construction. They certainly went to 
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~ the point that the stock \\'as not spurious, and 
that it \Yas not invalid by reason of the fraudu-
lent or kno\Yn acts or omissions of the officers 
in question." 
-- J.\!lcDonald vs. Reich and Lieure, Inc., 100 Cal. 
App. 736, 281 P. 106, at p. 108. (Though not closely 
analagous to the present case, this case contains the 
following language.) 
"When a corporation issues to the public 
certificates of stock, regular on their face, it 
amounts substantially to a representation that 
the certificates are regular and valid. Certifi-
cates of stock so issued by a corporation, but 
which were irregular or void for reasons not 
participated in by the stockholder, have been 
held to amount to a misrepresentation and 
fraud upon the part of the corporation officials 
for which the corporation is answerable. Cit-
ing Green vs. Caribou Oil Mining Company, 
179 Cal. 787, 178 Pac. 950; Sykes vs. Pure Food 
Cider Company, 157 Iowa, 601, 138 N.W. 554; 
Windram vs. French, 151 Mass. 547, 24 N.E. 
914, 8 L.R.A. 750." 
Daniels vs. Craiglow, 131 Kan. 500, 292 P. 771. 
"* * * by authenticating and issuing the 
share certificate, the president and secretary 
represented to plaintiff that the sale was not 
tainted with illegality on account of omission 
to procure a Blue Sky permit." Citing Win-
dram vs. French, supra. 
Sykes vs. Pure Food Cider Co., et al, 138 N.W. 
554, 157 Iowa 601. 
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"Had plaintiff purchased the shares of 
stock from defendant, then there could have 
been no doubt as to the liability of the latter. 
In authenticating and issuing the certificates 
of stock, the defendant, in connection with Al-
brook, as officers of the company, made the 
representations•contained therein, and implied 
from their issuance, '"Jhich, like the offer of 
a letter of credit, addressed themselves to who-
ever should purchase these certificates there-
after, whoever he might be.'" Citing Win-
dram vs. French, supra, Bruff vs. Mali, supra, 
First National Bank vs. Lanier, supra, and 
Stickel vs. Atwood, post. 
Stickel vs. Atwood, 25 R.I. 456, 56 Atl. 687. 
This case holds that the president of a corpora-
tion who participated in the issuance of bonds which 
falsely represent that they are secured by all the 
property of a corporation, is liable in an action for 
deceit by the purchaser of the bonds, though the 
president was ignorant of the sale in question. 
The record establishes that Horne signed the 
certificate knowing it was to be issued to the Kartch-
ners. According to his own testimony: 
Q. "At the time you signed the certifi-
cate you know the certificate was for 100,000 
shares of stock? 
A. "Yes. 
Q. "You knew it was a certificate to be 
purchased by Irene and A. C. Kartchner did 
you not? 
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A. "'Yes, that is correct. 
Q. "'At that time-
A. "I don't know about Irene; let me 
look at that? 
Q. "By lVIr. and 1\tirs. Kartchner, let's 
put it that \vay? 
A. "All right. 
Q. "'It that true? 
A. "Yes." 
There is no question that Sorensen knew with, 
whom he \Yas dealing, as he prepared the certificate 
to be issued to the Kartchners and handed it to them. 
It requires no ingenuity to see that representa-
tions that a stock certificate is genuine and valid, and 
that the officers are the persons they purport to be 
are material representations. 
c. 
The Court should have found that each of the 
material representations set forth in B. above was 
false when made. Dealing with each representation 
separately, the reasons are as follows: 
1. The representation that Dr. Horne was, at 
the time he signed and issued the Kartchner certifi-
cate, the duly authorized and acting President of the 
corporation was false because (a) Dr. Horne had re-
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signed his office the previous day and (b) if title to 
his stock passed to the corporation the previous day 
(we doubt that it did) he was disqualified to hold 
that office thereafter. 
(a) Dr. Horne, on October 31, 1949, wrote to 
the Clicquot Club Bottling Company of Salt Lake 
City, a letter saying: 
"I, hereby, resign as president of the com-
pany and director of the company (Clicquot 
Club Bottling Company of Salt Lake City)." 
He mailed that letter to the office of the bottling 
company, which was on the floor below that of his 
office and in the same building. His intention is 
shown by his testimony ( 110 and 111 ) . 
. Q. (by Mr. Tanner) "Let's see, at one 
time, Dr. Horne, you were president of the 
Clicquot Club Bottling Company of Salt Lake 
City, were you not? 
A. "Yes. 
Q. "You resigned October 31st, 1949, did 
you not? 
A. "Right." 
His intention is further shown by the word 
''hereby'' in the letter of resignation. However, there 
is the following testimony by Horne ( 196) : 
A. (by Horne) "Yes, I asked Mr. Soren-
sen, 'Should I sign the certificate; I sent you 
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a resignation last night.~ l-Ie said, 'I haven't 
got it,' so officially the company hadn't re-
ceived my resignation, so I \Vas officially still 
considered the company's president, so I signed 
it." 
The effect of mailing that resignation is estab-
lished in the case of Security Investors' Realty Co. vs. 
Superior Court In and For Los Angeles County, et al, 
101 Cal. App. 450, 281 P. 709, where a summons 
was attempted to be served on a secretary of a corpor-
ation who had tendered his resignation by depositing 
it in the United States mail, directed to the Security 
Investors' Realty Co. and J. Meyer, President thereof. 
That case holds as follows: 
"It would therefore follow that the resig-
nation of Shirley E. Meserve as secretary and 
as director vvas complete and effective, and 
that service in this case had upon him as an 
officer of the corporation was the same as if 
made upon a stranger." 
The proposition for which this case stands is 
stated in the headnote prepared by the court, as fol-
lows: 
"Where secretary and director of corpora-
tion deposited resignation in writing in mail, 
directed to corporation and president thereof, 
resignation was complete and effective, not-
withstanding by-laws to effect that each direc-
tor should serve term for which elected and 
until successor should quality, and that officers 
should be elected annually and hold office 
until successors were appointed." 
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In the a hove case, there was no evidence what-
ever that the resignation was ever received by the 
corporation, only that it had been mailed. 
The case of Harry Levi and Co., Inc. vs. Feldman, 
et al, 61 N.Y.S. 2d, 639, holds that a resignation 
stating that it takes effect at once becomes effective 
when tendered and the authority of the officers may 
not thereafter be revived by his own act. The precise 
holding is as follows: 
"The resignation of Harry Levi as Presi-
dent and Director states that it was to take 
effect at once. It became effective when ten-
dered. * * * (citing cases) * * *. Any voluntary 
acts on his part subsequent thereto would not 
thereby revive in him the office of President 
without his election thereto pursuant to the 
by-laws of the corporation * * * (citing cases) 
****" 
(b) If the title to Dr. Horne's stock passed to 
the corporation at the time it was mailed on October 
31, 1949, that fact standing alone would disqualify 
him to hold the office of President and Director 
thereafter. He would, therefore, be completely with-
out authority to sign the Kartchner certificate on 
November 1, 1949. 
The articles of incorporation of the defendant 
corporation were placed in evidence at the trial; how-
ever, it appears that they were not transmitted to 
this court with the Record on Appeal. The portion 
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of those articles "·ith \vhich we are now concerned 
is .Article 7, \Yhich reads as follows: 
"The number and kind of officers of the 
corporation shall be as folln\-vs; A board of six 
director, one of \Yhom shall be President, one 
of \vhom shall be Vice-President, one shall be 
Second \'ice-President, one may be Secretary, 
and one may be the Treasurer of the corpora-
tion; the office of Secretary and Treasurer may 
be held by the same person; each person to 
be eligible to election as director must be the 
holder and owner, in his or her name, of at 
least one share of the common stock of the 
corporation, as shown by the books of the 
corporation; four members of the board of 
directors shall be necessary or form a quorum, 
and be authorized to transact the business and 
exercise the corporation powers of the corpora-
tion." 
Section 18-2-20, U.C.A., 1943, provides as fol-
lows: 
"The corporate powers of the corporation 
shall be exercised by the board of directors, 
who shall be stockholders of the company, and 
at least one of whom shall be a resident of this 
state; * * * *" 
It is apparent that if, on October 31, 1949, Dr. 
Horne ceased to be a stockholder of the company he 
could not be a Director thereof, under the express 
provisions of the statute above set forth. If he could 
not be a Director, he was not qualified to be the Pres-
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ident of the corporation, for the reason that the 
Articles of Incorporation provide that the President 
shall be "one of a board of six directors." 
If Dr. Horne was not the President, whether 
he believed himself to be President or not, the Kartch-
ner certificate would not have been genuine for the 
reason that the signature in the "President" space 
was not that of the President. 
2. The representation that he (Dr. Horne) 
knew of nothing which would or might make his 
acts as such President invalid is false because Dr. 
Horne knew he had signed and sent in his resignation 
and, at the very least, knew that this might terminate 
his authority to act in that capacity. Further, he is 
held to know the provisions of the articles of the de-
fendant corporation and to know that when he ceased 
to be a stockholder he ceased to be qualified to be a 
Director and the President. He certainly knew he 
had sent his stock to the corporation on the previous 
day, endorsed, with a letter purporting to terminate 
his interest in it. 
3. The representation that the certificate for 
100,000 shares of stock of said corporation was gen-
uine and valid was false because (a) Horne was not 
the President and hence his signature as such would 
destroy the genuineness of that certificate, and (b) 
the certificate was an overissue in its entirety and 
hence void. 
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The proposition that Dr. Horne was not the Pres-
ident of the defendant corporation when he signed 
the certificate has been discussed above. The propo-
sition that the stock certificate was an overissue when 
made IS THE L110ST INJPORTANT SINGLE PROP-
OSITION I1V THE CASE AND GOES TO THE HEART 
OF THE APPEAL. 
For the following reasons the certificate consti-
tuted an overissue of stock: 
In the State of Utah, the law controlling the 
transfer of title to shares of stock is the Uniform Stock 
Transfer Act, Sec. 18-3 U.C.A., 1943. The portions 
of that act with which we are here concerned are: 
"18-3-1 Exclusive Manner of Transfer. 
Title to a certificate and to the shares 
represented thereby can be transferred only: 
( 1) By delivery of the certificate in-
dorsed either in blank or to a specified person 
by the person appearing by the certificate to 
be the owner of the shares represented there-
by; or 
( 2) By delivery of the certificate and a 
separate document containing a written assign-
ment of the certificate or a power of attorney 
to sell, assign or transfer the same or the shares 
represented thereby, signed by the person ap-
pearing by the certificate to be the owner of 
the shares represented thereby. Such assign-
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ment or power of attorney may be either in 
blank or to a specified person. 
The provisions of this section shall be a p-
plicable although the charter or articles of in-
corporation or code of regulations or by-laws of 
the corporation issuing the certificate and the 
certificate itself provide that the shares repre-
sented thereby shall be transferrable only on 
the books of the corporation or shall be regis-
tered by a transfer agent. 
18-3-9 Delivery of Certificate Without In-
dorsement. 
The delivery of a certificate by the person 
appearing by the certificate to be the ovvner 
thereof without the indorsement requisite for 
the tranfer of the certificate and the shares rep-
resented thereby but with intent to transfer 
such certificate or shares shall impose an obli-
gation, in the absence of an agreement to the 
contrary, upon the person so delivering to 
complete the transfer by making the necessary 
indorsement. The transfer shall take effect as 
of the time when the indorsement is actually 
made. This obligation may be specifically en-
forced. (Italics ours.) 
18-3-18 Indorsement, How Made. 
A certificate is indorsed when an assign-
ment or a power of attorney to sell, assign or 
transfer the certificate or the shares repre-
sented thereby is written on the certificate and 
signed by the person appearing by the cer-
tificate to be the owner of the shares repre-
sented thereby, or when the signature of such 
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person is vvritten without more upon the back 
of the certificate. In any of such cases a certifi-
cate is indorsed though it has not been deliv-
ered. 
''18-3-20 Definitions. 
( 1) In this chapter, unless the context 
or subject matter otherwise requires: 
"Delivery" means voluntary transfer of 
possession from one person to another. 
"Person" includes a corporation or part-
nership or two or more persons having a joint 
of common interest. 
"Transfer" means transfer of legal title." 
On October 31, 1949, there was no common 
stock in the treasury of the defendant Clicquot Club 
Bottling Company of Salt Lake City, since all 200,000 
shares had been issued and were then outstanding. 
Our problem is to ascertain whether, at the moment 
on November 1, 1949, that the Kartchner certificate 
was issued to the plaintiffs by the defendants, there 
was sufficient stock available for issue tn enable the 
issuance of 100,000 shares. It seems obvious that the 
only stock available for issue would be stock the title 
to which had passed back to the corporation. 
The Stanis and Winder stock, 58,000 shares, was, 
and still is, outstanding in them. The balance of 
142,000 shares was comprised of the Horne and Sor-
ensen stock. 
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The Horne stock was endorsed by the owners 
in blank and placed in an envelope directed to the 
company, together with a letter saying' 
"Please find enclosed with ths letter all 
of the stock certificates in my name, Lyman 
M. Horne, M.D., and those in the name of 
Myrtle S. Horne. I am returning them to you 
as of the above date. I do, hereby, relinquish 
my interest in the Clicquot Club Bottling Com-
pany of Salt Lake City." 
The envelope containing this letter and stock 
was mailed and had not been received at the corpor-
ation office prior to the issuance of the Kartchner 
certificate. 
DILEMMA 
If delivery of those certificates was complete 
when mailed, the defendant Horne ceased to be a 
stockholder on October 31,1949, by virtue of that fact 
alone, separate and apart from his resignation, and 
hence his authority to be President terminated at 
that moment because he was, at that moment, dis-
qualified from holding office. See discussion of this 
point under II C 1 above. 
If delivery of those certificates was complete 
when they were received in the mail from Horne, 
the title to them was not in the corporation and they 
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were not az ·ailable for issue at the time of the issuance 
of the Kartchner certificate. 
The latter of the above propositions is the one 
the plaintiffs assert to be the case. vVhen delivery of 
stock is made by mail, the process of delivery begins 
with the mailing and ends with the arrival of the 
stock, via mail man, at the place to which it is ad-
dressed. "Delivery" is defined as the voluntary trans-
fer of possession from one person to another. This 
does not mean transfer to just any other person what-
soever, rather it means to the person to whom title 
is to pass or his agent. In the principal case, although 
he was only a few steps away from the corporation 
office, Dr. Horne chose to mail his certificates. H~ 
deliberately chose a circuitous route of delivery and 
caused the actual handing over of the stock to be 
forestalled for a day. It is the view of the plaintiffs 
that delivery of that stock was complete, and title 
passed, when the agency chosen by Horne deposited 
the certificates in the office of the corporation, i.e., 
of the person to whom they were to be delivered. 
That point of time was some time after the Kartchner 
certificate had been issued and may or may not 
have been on November 1, 1949. 
What, then, of the Sorensen stock? His 101,000 
shares would more than cover the Kartchner certifi-
cate if they had been in the treasury when the Kartch-
ner certificate was issued. 
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In the first place, Sorensen never delivered his 
stock to the corporation. Horne, apparently on his 
own, with no instructions to do so, put Sorensen's 
certificate in with his and Mrs. Horne's when he 
mailed them. The reason . for this is found in the 
letters of transmittal. Dr. Horne was severing all re-
lation with the defendant corporation and, in the 
course of so doing, was returning to Fred Sorensen 
all of the documents pertaining to the defendant cor-
poration which were still in his possession. Sorensen 
didn't even know the certificates were on their way 
to him until Dr. Horne told him so at the time Sor-
ensen took the Kartchner certificate to him to be 
signed. He says (229, 230): 
Q. (by Mr. Tanner). "After the Doctor 
said he told you that day (the day the Kartch-
ner certificate was issued) he mailed the certif-
icates, did you know prior to that time he 
mailed them to you? (Parentheses ours.) 
A. "No." 
Further, Sorensen himself believed his stock had 
not been turned back to the corporation ( 180) : 
Q. (by Mr. Tanner). "Then subsequent 
to that time, and prior to the time that the 
certificate was handed to Mr. Kartchner, 
what, if any, of the stock was actually returned 
and released? 
A. (by Sorensen). Dr. Horne's stock was 
returned to the corporation. 
Q. "As of what date? 
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A. "As of that date, I believe. (November 
1, 1949) 
Q. "And that is the only stock that was 
turned in at that time, is that right? 
A. "My stock was there, it was not en-
dorsed. 
Q. "In other words, it hadn't been turned 
back? 
A. "It hadn't been turned back. 
Q. "That is correct, isn't it? 
A. "That is correct." (Parentheses ours.) 
It would put an undue strain on the evidence to 
conclude that when Dr. Horne sent Sorensen's certifi-
cate back to him in an envelope addressed to the 
corporation, Sorensen thereby delivered the stock to 
the corporation in accordance with the requirements 
of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act. 
However, even if that remarkable result were 
achieved, it still would avail the defendants nothing, 
for the Sorensen certificate had not been endorsed. 
(See above.) This fact is shown by Sorensen's and 
Horne's clear testimony as set forth in the argument 
under point I B. above; The Uniform Stock Transfer 
Act, Sec. 18-3-9 (set forth in full above) provides for 
delivery without endorsement and states that such 
delivery imposes the duty of endorsement, but "The 
transfer shall take effect as of the time the endorse-
ment is actually made." The conclusion is inescap-
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able that the Sorensen stock was not available for 
re-issue until the time, some time after the issue of 
the Kartchner certificate, when Sorensen placed on 
that certificate the signature which is on it now 
(Exhibit 2). 
It is, then, clear that at the time the Kartchner 
certificate "vas issued it was an overissue in its en-
tirety, since the corporation had not re-acquired title 
to a single share of stock by the time of the issue. As 
such it is absolutely and irreparably void. 
That an overissue is void is established by the 
Constitution of the State of Utah, Article XII, Sec-
tion 5: 
"* * * The stock of corporations shall not 
be increased, except in pursuance of general 
law, nor shall any law authorize the increase 
of stock without the consent of the person or 
persons holding the larger amount in value of 
the stock, or without due notice of the proposed 
increase having previously been given in such 
manner as may be prescribed by law. All fic-
titious increase of stock or indebtedness shall 
be void.'' 
It is clearly recognized by the textbooks: 
Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporations, Permanent 
Edition, Vol. II, Sec 5144 at pages 243 and 323: 
"Where there is an overissue, the increase 
and the certificates are void because of the 
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fact that it is beyond the povvers of the cor-
poration to create and issue the additional 
stock, and the holders of the certificates, there-
fore, ·whether they be the original holders or 
their bona fide transferees, do not become 
stockholders, * * *." 
"Of course a corporation has no power 
to issue certificates in excess of the an1ount 
of its authorized capital stock. If it does so, 
there is an overissue or unauthorized increase 
and the certificates are void, and neither con-
fer rights nor impose liabilities as a stock-
holder, and the corporation may be liable in 
damages to bona fide purchases and holders of 
the pretended stock." 
The case of Pruitt vs. Oklahoma Steam Baking 
Company, et al, 39 Okla. 509, 136 P. 730, is a case 
where 100 shares of the capital stock of the defendant 
company were issued after the full amount of the 
authorized capital stock had already been issued. The 
effect of this is discussed as follows: 
"The act, therefore, of the baking com-
pany in issuing to plaintiff the 100 shares of 
its stock, in excess of the amount limited and 
prescribed by its articles of incorporation, was 
a nullity. It is said in Cook on Stock and Stock-
holders, Section 292, in stating the law on this 
subject: 'By overissued stock is to be under-
stood stock issued in excess of the amount lim-
ited and prescribed by the act of incorporation. 
Certificates of stock issued in excess of the cer-
tificates that represent the full authorized cap-
ital stock of the corporation represent over-
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issued stock. Such stock is spurious and wholly 
void. This is the settled law, and it prevails 
equally whether the over-issue is the result 
of accident or mistake, or want of knowledge 
of the law, or is due to fraud and intentional 
wrong-doing. The animus or intent of the par-
ties to the over-issue is not material. Over-
issued stock, no matter hovv over-issued, rep-
resents nothing and is wholly and entirely val-
ueless and void. So rigid and well established is 
this rule that not even a bona fide holder of 
such stock can give to it any validity or vitali-
ty.' Both by statute and at common law the 
issuance of the stock, delivered to plaintiff in 
exchange for his land, as we have seen, "\'vas 
void and not merely voidable at the plaintiff's 
election." 
This is later affirmed in the State of Oklahoma 
in the case of Garnett vs. State ex rel. Bank Com-
missioner, 19 P. 2d, 375, and the cases following. It 
is held to be the law in Kansas, in the case of Trapp 
vs. Railroad Men's Refining Company, 114 Kan. 618, 
220 P. 249. In the State of Utah, in the case of East 
River Bottom Water Company vs. Boyce, 102 Utah 
149, 128 P. 2d 277, referred to and affirmed in East 
River Bottom Water Company vs. Dunford, 167 P. 
2d 693, it was held that a duplicate issue of seven 
shares was and is void, even in the hands of a bona 
fide holders, thus affirming the general rule above. 
4. The representation of Dr. Horne that the 
certificate passed the title to 100,000 shares of the 
capital stock of the defendant corporation was false 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
55 
because that certificate was void at the moment is 
was issued and could have no effect as an instrument 
of property. 
5. The representation of Dr. Horne that there 
were no facts which were or should have been known 
to him which would render said certificate, or any 
portion thereof, invalid is palpably false. He knew 
he had resigned, though he may not have known 
the legal effect of it; he knew he had sent back all 
of his stock and, not being a stockholder could not 
be President or a Director; and he knew that Sor-
ensen's certificate was unendorsed and that neither 
his, his wife's or Sorensen's certificate had reached 
the company by the time he signed the Kartchner 
certificate. But even knowing all of these facts, Dr. 
Horne went ahead, heedless of the rights of the 
Kartchners and of his duty to them and signed and 
issued the certificate, expecting them to rely on his 
signature and its validity, and expecting them to pay 
for it. 
That the defendant Sorensen's representations 
were false is established by the same reasoning that 
applies to the representations of the defendant Dr. 
Horne. 
D. 
The court should have found that the defendants 
and each of them knew the facts that made their 
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representations false, and made those representations 
either knowing them to be false or without knowing 
them to be true. 
The facts essential to the falsity of the represen-
tations of the defendants are that Dr. Horne had re-
signed his office as President and Director and had 
mailed his certificates to the corporation, and that 
no shares had been returned to the corporation for 
re-issue by the time of the issuance of the Kartchner 
certificate. 
That Dr. Horne knew he had resigned is, of 
course, a necessary conclusion from his letters of res-
ignation. That he told Sorensen he had resigned is 
directly stated by the defendant Horne ( 196). So 
Sorensen, too, knew Horne had resigned. But this 
deterred neither of them. They went right ahead 
without even investigating the effect of that resig-
nation, and issued the certificates for which the plain-
tiffs were to pay $18,000.00 
That Dr. Horne knew Sorensen's stock had not 
been transferred to the corporation for re-issue is 
implicit in his testimony that Soresen was going to 
transfer his stock to the corporation (197, 198). That 
Sorensen knew he had not transferred his stock to 
the corporation is a necessary conclusion from the 
fact that Sorensen didn't know, until the time on 
November 1, 1949, when Dr. Horne told him so, 
that his certificates had been· mailed back to the cor-
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poration and from his testimony (180), that his stock 
had not been turned back by the time the Kartchner 
stock was issued. 
An examination of the stub in the stockbook 
(Exhibit "l\II'') shows that, at the time the Kartchner 
certificate 'Yas issued it was not even purported to 
be covered by previously surrendered stock. See stub 
for certificate 15 and compare with the stuns for 
certificates 12 and 13. 
E. 
The court should have found that the plaintiffs, 
and each of them, were entitled to rely and did rely 
upon the false representations of the defendants and 
each of them, to their damage in the amount of 
$18,046.53. 
That the plaintiffs were entitled to rely upon 
the representations of the President and managing 
Director of a corporation relative to the stock of that 
corporation can scare be doubted. That the defend-
ants and each of them did, in fact, so rely, is shown 
by the testimony discussed hereafter at pages 63 
and 64. 
There has never been any doubt cast upon the 
evidence of the plaintiffs ( 136), supported by Ex-
hibit "L" that they paid $18,046.53 from their joint 
funds and assets for their certificate for 100,000 
shares of the stock of the defendant corporation. Since 
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the evidence on this point is uncontroverted, the court 
should have found that the amount of damage each 
plaintiff sustained was one-half of $18,046.53. 
Point III 
Officers and Directors Occupy a Fiduciary Rela-
tion to Persons to Whom They Seek to Sell Stock in 
the Corporation of Which They Are Officers. 
The same reasoning which holds promoters, of-
ficers and directors of a corporation to be fiduciaries 
as to the corporation and all of its stockholders, dic-
tates that those persons should be held to be in a 
fiduciary relation with those whom they induce 
to become stockholders. That this is the law is 
set forth in the case of Wills vs. Nehalem Coal Co., 
52 Or. 70, 96 P. 528, at page 531, as follows: 
"The principle upon which courts of equi-
ty proceed in these cases is a very familiar one. 
The promoter of a company, like its directors, 
is deemed to sustain towards the members of 
the company the relation of a trustee toward 
his cestui que trust.* * * This confidential re-
lationship extends not only to present stock-
holders, but to persons whom they invite or 
solicit to subscribe for or purchase shares in 
the company, and their intentional omission to 
disclose facts to intending subscribers is as 
much fraud as a positive misrepresentation. 
14 A. and E. Ency. Law (2d Ed.) 78." 
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The above proposition is reaffirmed in' the case 
of Rugger z's. 1\lt. Hood Electirc Co., 20 P. 2d 412, 
143 Or. 193; re-hearing denied, 21 P. 2d, 1100, 143 
Or. 193. 
Both defendants were directors in the defendant 
corporation and Dr. Horne was the President. The 
standard of conduct to which each must be held in 
his dealings with the Kartchners is that of a fiduci-
ary. As fiduciaries, their failure to disclose to the 
Kartchners that the stock which would be required 
to make their certificate valid had not been trans-
ferred to the corporation and their faulure to disclose 
the facts concerning Dr. Horne's resignation, make 
them liable for any damages resulting to the Kartch-
ners by virtue of those nondisclosures. 
Point IV 
It Is the Duty of Officers and Directors to Know 
That Material Statments in Stock Certificates and the 
Representations Implicit In Their Signing and Issu-
ing Those Certificates Are True. 
In Utah directors are charged by statute with 
knowledge of corporate affairs. 
Section 18-2-27, U.C.A., 1943: 
"Every director of a corporation is deemed 
to possess such a knowledge of the affairs of 
his corporation as to enable him to determine 
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whether any act, proceeding or omission of 
the board is a violation of law." 
The main reason for charging the directors with 
knowledge of the corporate affairs, irrespective of 
their actual knowledge, is that the directors are the 
ones designated by law to exercise the powers of the 
corporation. 
Section 18-2-20, U.C.A., 1943: 
"The corporate powers of the corporation 
shall be exericsed by the board of directors, 
who shall be stockholders of the company,* 
* * " 
That this duty exists relative to bonds issued by 
a corporation is clearly set out in the case of Minnie 
I. Ashby vs. Richard C. Peters, et al, 128 Neb. 338, 
258 N.W. 639, 99 A.L.R. 843, which states, headnote 
1, 
"It is the duty of directors to know that 
material statments in bonds issued under their 
authority, as in the case at bar, and for the 
benefit of their company are true. Such dir-
ectors are liable for damages sustained by 
anyone buying such bonds who relied upon 
the truth of such statements which are now 
provided to have been false when made." 
The a hove case has much in common with the 
case at bar, except that it holds officers personally 
liable who are guilty of less misconduct and have 
less actual knowledge than in the present case. Three 
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directors who had no actual knowledge of the falsity 
of statements contained in certain bonds and who 
made no personal representations to the purchaser 
of them, "vere held personally liable to that purchaser 
for the loss sustained by her on the bonds. 
In the principal case, Dr. Horne was a director, 
as was Sorensen. Horne made no statements directly 
to the purchasers of the stock, but only signed and 
issued the stock certificate. Horne claims that he 
is not liable because he did not knowingly make any 
statements to the purchasers, let alone false state-
ments. However, Horne is liable because he was a 
Director and the President of the corporation and 
is chargeable with a much higher duty than would 
otherwise be the case. Upon him the law places the 
task of examining to see if statements made in securi-
ties issued by him are, in fact, true. 
See annotation at 99 A.L.R. 852 on this subject. 
See Ward vs. Trimble, 103 Ky. 153, 44 S.VV .... 450, 
where a bank president was held to be conclusively 
presumed to have knowledge ofits affairs, rendering 
him liable for deceit in the sale of its stock. 
Hence, Dr. Horne as President-Director is con-
clusively presumed to know the effect of his acts and 
whether there was stock available to make the Kartch-
ner stock valid when issued. Such stock was not 
available in fact and both the defendants Horne and 
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Sorensen are bound by law to the knowledge of that 
fact, irrespective of their actual knowledge, which 
was substantial. 
Point V 
Such Officers and Directors Are Personally Li-
able to Persons Who Relied Upon the Truth of Those 
Representations Which Are Proved To Have Been 
False When Made. 
This proposition is established by the following 
cases: 
Windram vs. French, supra. 
Ashby vs. Peters, supra. 
Cases at 99 A.L.R. 852. 
Sykes vs. Pure Food Cider Co., et al. supra. 
Stickel vs. Atwood, supra. 
Tlwmpson on Corporation, 2d edition, Sec. 
3554, states: 
"The purchaser of overissued stock, or his 
good faith transferee~ may recover his damages 
in an action against the officers directly re-
sponsible for the overissue,* * * (citing cases) 
* * * " 
Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporation, Permanent Ed-
ition, Vol. 11, Sec. 5144, at page 246, says: 
"A corporation, and under some circum-
stances its directors, officers or agents, may be 
held answerable in damages or otherwise, by 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
63 
stockholders and bona fide purchasers for an 
unauthorized increase or an overissue." 
That the plaintiff Irene B. Kartchner relied upon 
the representation of Horne and Sorensen that the 
certificate was good for 100,000 shares of Clicquot 
Club's stock and was valid and genuine is shown by 
the only evidence on that point, as follows ( 184, 
185): 
Q. (by Mr. Tanner) "Were you present 
·when the stock certificate, which is plantiff's 
Exhibit 'B,' was issued by the president and 
director of the Clicquot Club Bottling Com-
pany of Salt Lake City, Noven1.ber 1st, 1948?" 
A. (by Mrs. Kartchner) "Yes, I was." 
Q. "At that time, Mrs. Kartchner, did 
you believe that to be a valid certificate?" 
A. "Yes." 
Q. "Did you believe that it represented 
100,000 shares of Clicquot Club stock?" 
A. "I thought so." 
Q. "If you had not believed it was a valid 
stock certificate representing 100,000 shares 
of stock, would you have paid for it?" 
A. "No." 
The plaintiff A. C. Kartchner said ( 133): 
Q. (by Mr. Tanner) "Did you believe 
what he said to be true?" 
A. "I believed Mr. Sorensen, yes. Heap-
peared to me like an honest man and the way 
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he talked I thought he meant what he said and 
I believed everything he told me. I had no rea-
son to doubt if he thought we could do it, we 
could do it." 
* * * * * 
Q. "When you received the stock certifi-
cate for 100,000 shares of stock, did you believe 
that gave you half of the business?" 
A. "I did." 
Q. "Would you h:~ve paid for that stock 
certificate if you had believed otherwise?" 
A. "No." 
The record is replete with testimony and with 
evidence of the actions of the plaintiffs which clearly 
show that they relied on the representations implicit 
in the certificate that it was genuine and valid and 
gave them 100,000 shares of stock of the Clicquot 
Club Bottling Company of Salt Lake City. Pre-emin-
ent among that evidence is the evidence that they 
paid for the stock. 
Point VI 
Scienter or Knowledge on the Part of One Mak-
ing a material representation which is in fact false 
is not necessary to liability for damages arising there-
from where there is a duty on the part of such per-
son to know the facts and his lack of knowledge is 
due to a neglect of that duty. 
See Ashby vs. Peters, supra. 
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In 73 A.L.R. at page 1120 is an annotation en-
titled "Fraud: Necessity for knowledge of falsity of 
representation as to value, inducing subscription to 
or purchase of corporate stock, or other securities." 
Among the propositions set forth in that annotation 
is the following at page 1130: 
"There is a difference of opinion, in the 
cases within the scope of the annotation, as to 
the necessity for an actual fraudulent intent in 
making the misrepresentation, and the effect 
of the existence, or absence, of reasonable 
grounds for belief in the truth thereof." 
At page 1131, the rule supported by the majority 
is stated: 
"In this country, while more than mere 
negligence is essential to support a charge of 
fraud which induces the purchase of corporate 
stock or other securities, an actual fraudulent 
intent in making representations of matters 
as of which one is ignorant is not, according to 
the weight of authority, essential." 
The reason for this mle is: 
"* * * * * the doctrine of fraud is a 
constmctive one merely, and the party's con-
duct, rather than his actual intent, controls, or, 
to state the matter differently, the party mak-
ing the misrepresentations will not, under 
some circumstances, be heard to say that he 
had no intent to deceive and therefore cannot 
be held liable for fraud." 
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These rules illustrate that it is not necessary for 
the plaintiffs to have proved an actual fraudulent 
state of mind on the part of the defendants to prove 
a cause of action in the instant case. 
In this case there was a duty on both Horne and 
Sorense:p. to know whether there was stock available 
for issue when they issued the Kartchner certificate. 
Neither of them investigated to see whether such 
stock was available, and it wasn't. 
To allow these defendants to escape liability on 
the ground that they did not actually know there was 
no stock available for issue to the Kartchners would 
be setting a most dangerous precedent. The court 
would be saying to Presidents and Directors of corpo-
rations that they are free to issue void stock so long 
as they are so ignorant of the affairs of their corpora-
tions (and, in the case of Horne, the effect of his res-
ignation) that they do not know the stock to be in-
valid. 
Such a rule would put a premium on careless 
conduct and ignorance, and would reward those cor-
porate officers who paid the least attention to the 
duties imposed on them by statue and by their volun-
tary acceptance of corporate office and responsibility. 
A corporate officer who paid no attention whatever 
to the affairs of corporation would then be free of 
liability for his misrepresentations. 
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Point VII 
Qne who represents a thing to be true without 
knowing it to be true, is liable in deceit if it is in fact 
false. 
The Federal Supreme Court has held that a state-
ment ·which is recklessly made, without knowledge of 
its truth, and which is in reality false, is a false state-
ment knowingly made, within the well-settled rule 
respecting fraud. Cooper vs. Schlesinger, 111 U. S. 
148, 28 L. ed. 382, 4 S. Ct. 360. This rule is so well 
known and universally accepted as to make citation 
of further authority superfluous. 
The defendants Horne and Sorenson are liable 
for deceit even if they did not know the Kartchner 
certificate was void because they have represented 
it to be a valid certificate without knowing it to be 
valid. In view of the knowledge they had at the time 
they issued the Kartchner certificate, the representa-
tions of the defendants were necessarily reckless. 
Point VIII 
Neither ratification nor estoppel can render the 
Kartchner certificate valid or give the plaintiffs any 
rights under it. 
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This proposition is well set out in the case of 
Pruitt vs. Oklahoma Steam Baking Co., supra: 
"It is said that ratification in its correct 
sense is impossible equally of an illegal and a 
void contract. Moog v. Hannon's Adm'r., 93 
Ala. 503, sub nom., Moog v. Espalla, 9 South. 
596; Lindt v. Uihlein, 109 Iowa, 591, 79 N.W. 
73; Id., 80 N.W. 658; Bick v. Seal, 45 Mo. App. 
475; McCormick Harvesting Co. v. Miller, 54 
Neb. 644, 74 N.W. 1061; Rue v. Missouri Pac. 
Ry. Co., 74 Tex. 474, 8 S.W. 533, 15 Am. St. 
Rep. 852; Page on Contracts, Sec. 511. 
"When a corporation is acting within the 
general scope of the powers conferred upon it 
by the Legislature, the corporation, as well as 
persons contracting with it, may be estopped 
to deny that it has complied with the legal for-
malities which are prerequisites to its existence, 
or to its action, because such requisites might 
in fact have been complied with. But when a 
contract is beyond the powers conferred upon 
it by existing laws, neither the corporation nor 
the other party to the contract can be estopped, 
by assenting to it or by acting upon it, to say 
that it was prohibited by those laws. Neither 
can the contract be ratified by either party, 
because it could not have been authorized by 
either. No performance on either side can give 
the unlawful contract any validity or be the 
foundation of any right of action based upon it. 
Central Transportation Co. v. Pullman Palace 
Car Co., 139 U. S. 24, 11 Sup. Ct. 478, 35 L. 
Ed. 55." 
* * * * * 
"A very similar question was before the 
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Supreme Court of Massachusetts in .lnzerican 
Tube Works v. Boston Machine Co., 139 Mass. 
5, 29 N .E. 63, involving the unauthorized issue 
of a form of stock known as special stock. The 
court, speaking through Allen, C. L., said: 'The 
issue of special stock being invalid and being 
open to repudiation by the corporation itself 
or by dissenting stockholders, the plaintiff had 
an election to rescind the contract under which 
the special stock ""as taken and to be restored 
to its original position. Allen v. Herrick, 15 
Gray, 274, 284. It was not bound by any estop-
pel. In all the cases which have come under 
our observation where one has been held to be 
deemed a stockholder by estoppel, there has 
been a legal creation of the capital stock. Such 
was the case in Turnbull v. Payson, 95 U. S. 
418 (24 L. Ed. 437). But where the issue of the 
shares is illegal, where no sufficient steps have 
been taken to authorize the creation of the 
capital stock, where a person has acted and 
been treated as a stockholder in respect of 
shares which the company had no power to 
issue, and where the shares cannot legally 
exist, the person taking them cannot, by estop-
pel or otherwise, become a member in respect 
to them. Lindl. Partn. 134.' " 
The case of Laredo Implement Co. vs. Stevenson, 
66 Fed. 633, states the rule as follows: 
"Where the corporation is absolutely 
without power to issue the stock * * * no act 
or consent of the stockholder may estop him 
from denying the validity of the stock." 
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CONCLUSION 
Simply stated, the appellants' case is that the 
Kartchner certificate is void as an overissue and not 
genuine because signed by a president who had pre-
viously resigned, that the defendants Horne and Sor-
ensen are the persons who issued the certificate as 
valid, in violation of their fiduciary duty to the plain-
tiffs, that their doing so constitutes fraud and deceit 
as a matter of law, that the plaintiffs were entitled to 
rely and did rely on the representations of the de-
fendants that the certificate was valid and gave them 
100,000 shares of stock, and were damaged thereby 
in the amount of $18,046.53; and that Horne and 
Sorensen, as well as the corporation, are liable to 
them. 
To arrive at those simple propositions has, be-
cause of the shortcomings of the findings and con-
clusions below, required much discussion of the facts, 
been long and at times circuitous. We regret having 
been unable to achieve a less lengthy presentation, 
but felt that an exhaustive discussion of the facts was 
a necessary prelude to the relatively simple proposi-
tions of law controlling the case. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SKEEN, THURMAN & WoRSLEY, VERL C. 
RITCHIE AND EARL D. TANNER 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Appellants 
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